Antony Duff argues that the criminal law's characteristic function is to hold people responsible.
Antony Duff provides a sophisticated account of domestic 1 and international criminal law that binds together responsibility and authority. 2 He argues that a key function of the criminal law is to hold people responsible for their actions, and that trials are a form of dialogue in which the polity expresses its values and the alleged perpetrator must give an account of his conduct. This function of the criminal law is more crucial than deterrence or giving offenders the punishment they deserve. Duff argues that carrying out this function always raises the question of who has the authority to hold alleged wrongdoers responsible. Responsibility and authority are inseparable. The criminal law possesses authority only when the person held responsible, and those calling him to account, are all members of a community. In his analysis of the domestic criminal law he concludes that the relevant parties must all be citizens of the same polity. In the international criminal law, the relevant community is the moral community of humanity.
In Section 2, I will present Duff's theory of responsibility and authority in the criminal law. In Section 3, I argue that we should combine Duff's view with P.F. Strawson's reactive attitudes account of responsibility. 3 In Section 3, I criticize Duff's understanding of the role of citizenship (in domestic criminal law) and humanity (in the international criminal law). His argument for the importance of citizenship in the domestic law is that the most compelling alternative, appealing to the moral community, is unsatisfying in the way that any cosmopolitan theory that does not properly value local attachments is unsatisfying. I will argue that this conclusion is reached only via a false dichotomy. The moral community is relevant in both the domestic and international cases, but this does not mean we cannot account for the value of local attachments within our Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays (Methuen, New York, 1962) .
polities. The moral community must play a greater role in the domestic case, and the international case must rely on more than merely the community of moral agents.
Duff's Account of Responsibility and Authority
Responsibility plays two roles in Duff's analysis of the criminal law. The first is that the essential function of criminal law is to hold people responsible. This is responsibility in the sense of it being warranted to call someone to account, to demand that they give a response when challenged regarding the wrong they have allegedly done. Scanlon calls this attributive responsibility. 4 Person P is attributively responsible for some state of affairs in virtue of what it is that they have done. The trial holds them to account for some state of affairs, and the onus is on the alleged perpetrator to respond, either by denying that he is attributively responsible for the state of affairs, or by admitting he is attributively responsible but there is an excuse, or by admitting he is attributively responsible and that he is guilty of doing wrong.
This raises the question of who has the authority to hold alleged wrongdoers to account.
Person P is responsible for some state of affairs to some person, community, or institution. With the party that holds others to account we find an implicit appeal to a second form of responsibility, what Scanlon calls substantive responsibility. These are the obligations attached to certain identities or roles. For example, a teacher has a responsibility to teach and care for his students. When Duff discusses authority, he focuses on the question of who has the right to call the alleged wrongdoer to account. But he sometimes goes beyond this to suggest that a party may have not only the right but also the obligation to hold the alleged wrongdoer to account. We owe it to the victims to show that we take their wrongs seriously. To do this we must "share in the wrong" with the victim and call the perpetrator to account. 5 We even owe it to perpetrators to call them to account, because that is to treat them as responsible agents.
Duff attempts to define the 'we' that has the right, and sometimes the obligation, to do this.
The criminal law comprises the institutions and procedures through which we hold perpetrators responsible for their wrongs. "Such a practice of calling to account is possible, however, only within a normative community to which both called and callers can be said to belong." 6 He argues that the domestic case is the "salient paradigm" for criminal law. 7 Therefore, we should start with the domestic case and then extend or adapt it to account for international criminal law.
We need to identify the relevant community, which will in turn specify the set of public wrongs via its self-defining values. A system of domestic criminal law is not a set of prohibitions that makes conduct wrong. Rather, the criminal law determines "which precriminal wrongs should count as 'public' wrongs whose perpetrators are to be called to public account". 8 'Public' means neither that the offense is carried out in public, nor that the public is directly harmed (as might be the case with harm to the environment). "To call a wrong public in this sense is not to give a reason for the public to take an interest in it, but to express the judgment that it is their business." 9 When a wrong is the public's business, they may call alleged wrongdoers to account. In virtue of community membership, they must share a relationship that is substantive enough to authorize the practice of holding to account. This makes the wrong committed by one the proper concern of the other. Without that, B has no authority to call A to account because the wrong is not his proper concern. Duff argues that this authority cannot be simply created by the institutions or practices of criminal law. It must derive from some prior community relationship.
What community could ground this authority? One candidate is the community of moral agents.
Duff's own arguments might push one towards this answer. If public wrongs must be moral wrongs, that is, conduct that was wrong prior to any particular criminal law's existence, why not appeal to the moral community of humanity? We are each capable of being responsible for our conduct, and we collectively have the authority to call each other to account for wrongs. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 Iraq. A victim of a serious attack would be unsatisfied were his attacker to be convicted in a foreign court. 11 These local, particular, attached moral sentiments must find expression in the community that gives authority to the criminal law. Therefore the 'we' who hold alleged wrongdoers to account must be narrower than the entire moral community. It should be the citizens of a polity. Making the community the polity serves two important functions. First, it
gives the standing required to authoritatively hold people responsible. Second, it provides a way to pick out, from the set of moral wrongs, the subset of public wrongs. It accomplishes both of these functions through the polity's self-defining values.
"Public wrongs are our wrongs as citizens---wrongs in which we take a proper interest, to which we should collectively respond, for which we claim the right (and perhaps the duty) to call the perpetrator to answer to us." 12 Some of these wrongs are materially public, in the sense that the entire public is harmed. But that is not necessary. Most public wrongs are done to
individuals, yet these are public wrongs because they violate our public values. We share the Long, Ryan. "Responsibility, Authority, and the Community of Moral Agents in Domestic and International Criminal Law." International Criminal Law Review 14, no. 4-5 (2014): 836-854. DOI: 10.1163/15718123-01405006 wrong with the victim. Our concern for the victim as a fellow citizen makes the wrong our business, as does our recognition of the wrongdoer as a fellow citizen. A wrong done by one of us, when it violates our shared public values, is our business, and therefore we may (and perhaps ought to) hold its perpetrator responsible.
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Duff argues that making the polity the relevant community will specify a set of public wrongs, because "however minimal the public sphere of matters that concern all citizens is taken to be, any polity must have a public sphere, structured by its self-defining values". 14 Thus the authority of the criminal law is grounded in something that is historically and conceptually prior:
the co-citizen relationship among the polity's people. group the state should (but does not) recognize as citizens. When that occurs, an international court has the authority to intervene. It would be foolish to leave such matters up to the states in question. They might be unlikely to prosecute an official who uses torture in an official capacity, or to provide any adequate response to wrongs committed against a subjugated minority. So while it is ideal that a wrongdoer answers directly to his particular political community, this may not be possible. When the "crimes are serious enough to warrant the costs involved, it might be appropriate for an international court to claim jurisdiction or, absent such a court, for courts of other states to claim jurisdiction on behalf of the citizens whose own courts have let them down". 18 Thus national courts are left alone except when they fail to meet the minimum standard of fulfilling their obligations or in cases where the wrongs are genuinely international. Then an international body intervenes, but the essential structure of the criminal law does not change, because that court still acts on behalf of the relevant polity.
Duff rejects this account for two reasons. The first is that with the most egregious crimes against humanity, when the case for international intervention seems strongest, there might be doubt whether there exists a political community to which the perpetrator could answer. Suppose the target of the crimes is completely wiped out. This would leave no community to play the necessary role. The even more pressing matter is that we still have not explained how the ICC could have the unconditional right to act in the name of a political community. How could an international court have a legitimate but non-delegated authority?
This leads Duff to answer that the ICC acts on behalf of humanity. " [W] hat gives it the right to intervene on behalf of members of more local polities whose national courts have let them down is our shared humanity; but that is not far from saying that the perpetrators should have to 18 Ibid., p. 599. answer not merely to their polity, but to humanity." 19 This answer makes the international case fundamentally different from the domestic case, because humanity is not a political community.
Should we take this as evidence that the international criminal law does not have full authority until there is a global political community, or as evidence that when we extend our domestic analysis to the international realm, we must make some deep changes? One option is to argue that a global political community should be our aspiration, and only when humanity forms a political community will the international criminal law have unimpeachable authority. That is not Duff's position. He argues instead that we need only understand humanity as a moral community.
As in the domestic case, Duff denies that the public wrongs of international criminal law must harm the global moral community. One might argue that being so harmed gives humanity the standing to call alleged perpetrators to account. On the contrary, the reason we condemn and punish a wrongdoer is for the wrong he did to his specific victim(s). International public wrongs are not public because they harm humanity, but because they properly concern all members of humanity. " [T] hey are wrongs that we share in virtue of our membership of that community. A crime against humanity should be one that properly concerns us all, in virtue simply of our shared humanity."
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In the international case, authority is grounded in our shared membership in the moral community of humanity. This still leaves us with the task of specifying which particular wrongs are international public wrongs. Duff admits that must more work needs to be done on this issue. Long, Ryan. "Responsibility, Authority, and the Community of Moral Agents in Domestic and International Criminal Law." International Criminal Law Review 14, no. 4-5 (2014): 836-854. DOI: 10.1163/15718123-01405006 of "unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity". 21 The implication seems to be that moral egregiousness is the key to filling out this summation of his view: "some kinds of wrong should concern us, are properly our business, in virtue of our shared humanity with their victims (and perpetrators): for such wrongs the perpetrators must answer not just to their local communities, but to humanity".
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I will now provide a critical analysis of Duff's account of the relationship between responsibility and authority. In Section 3 I argue that P.F. Strawson's reactive-attitudes account of responsibility can both fill a gap in Duff's theory and further explain the moral psychology behind the international criminal law. In Section 4 I criticize Duff's view that the authority of the international law is generated by the moral community of humanity and provide an alternative explanation.
Where is Responsibility?
Duff does not provide any full theory of responsibility. However, it is clear that he favors a reasons-responsiveness view. 23 This grounds responsibility in a capacity to recognize reasons and to act or refrain from acting on the basis of reasons. Such an approach is more concerned with the link between reasons and actions than with any metaphysical conception of free will.
Duff also thinks that responsibility in the sense relevant to criminal law is always relational and practice based. By relational, he means it is always a matter of some subject being responsible 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Long, Ryan. "Responsibility, Authority, and the Community of Moral Agents in Domestic and International Criminal Law." International Criminal Law Review 14, no. 4-5 (2014): 836-854. DOI: 10.1163/15718123-01405006 for some object, and responsible to some body. It is practice based because to be responsible is to be liable to be held to responsible by someone within some particular institution or practice.
Within the practices relevant to criminal law, "we take it for granted that most adult human beings are responsible subjects". 24 He instead focuses on the separation between cases in which we take it for granted that a subject is responsible and the conditions that prevent someone from Philosophers may object that this work on responsibility and authority must engage with worries about determinism and free will. I will briefly outline a strategy for responding to that objection. Duff mentions that it might be added to his discussion of responsibility that determinism's truth or falsity is irrelevant to the practices under consideration, and cites P.F. we properly take when conduct is involuntary, or in Duff's terms, the subject lacks certain capacities that are required to be responsible. We can only properly take the objective stance towards a normal adult human for discrete moments, not universally. Some mentally disabled persons, however, may never be the proper object of the reactive attitudes. If we think lack of the relevant capacities matters, we must think that in normal cases, persons are capable of being responsible.
Strawson agrees with Duff's claim that we take responsibility for granted. "Our natural disposition to such attitudes and judgments is naturally secured against arguments suggesting they are in principle unwarranted or unjustified." 26 They are secured against any argument that they are globally unjustified, and therefore insulated from the truth or falsity of determinism. The 26 Strawson, supra note 3, p. 32. Strawson's work as a way to justify and fill out Duff's claim that we take responsibility for granted. I will now bracket and move on from the lively and ongoing dispute over free will and determinism.
Strawson's work, when combined with Duff's, also helps explain the moral psychology behind international criminal law. We should feel negative reactive attitudes about our polities and ourselves when we know there is a state in which public international wrongs go unanswered, or crimes of aggression go unanswered, and we could do something to hold the wrongdoer responsible. We should feel indignation towards the wrongdoers. If we do nothing, we should feel guilt about our ill will. If the entire globe were covered in domestic states that did an adequate job responding to public wrongs, there would be no reason to feel these negative attitudes towards ourselves. But when one state breaks down or turns malevolent, then showing good will towards our fellow members of humanity, whom we take it for granted are responsible agents, requires holding wrongdoers to account. The analysis Duff gives of the international law as grounded in the moral community is explicitly considered and rejected in his analysis of the domestic law. Appeal to the moral community is rejected as too universalist and impartial, and therefore unable to explain the value of local, particular attachments. Recall the examples of why a dictator should be tried by his own people, why someone who is wronged would be unsatisfied if his attacker were convicted by a foreign court, and so on. Duff takes these particular attachments to have a form of value that is destroyed by a universalist understanding of the criminal law. Thus when he demands there be a community that binds the one called to account and those doing the calling, he denies that this can simply be the entire moral community. It must be something narrower. It must be a political The structural similarity between this move and Richard Miller's work in distributive justice is illuminating. 28 He denies the apparent tension between universalist moral requirements and giving redistributive priority to one's worst-off compatriots. He argues that patriotic bias in redistribution is justified, not a violation of a universal ethical duty of equal concern for all persons. He therefore denies that there is a contradiction between patriotic bias and universal ethical requirements. There are crucial goods that all humans need, but that, for the majority of humanity, can only be realized in local communities. These are goods of self-respect and respectful social interaction. While some small number of privileged elites can obtain these goods in a way that transcends nationality, the overwhelming majority of humanity must secure them through interaction with their fellow citizens. Miller's point is that domestic bias in redistribution is not an exception to universal ethical requirements, it is universally required. To realize our good as social beings we must live in a polity, and that polity, if it has serious inequality, can only generate those goods when it prioritizes internal over external redistribution.
In states with significant inequality, lack of patriotic bias generates resentment and a loss of social trust, and therefore prevents citizens from securing those universal goods. Miller's argument on this point nicely dovetails with Duff's, since lack of patriotic bias in such polities not only undermines faith in the public political culture and inhibits participation in democratic political processes, it also undermines people's motivation to obey and respect the law.
My third option exhibits this same structure. We must create polities with self-defining values. This is because, as Miller argues, it is necessary for securing the universal good of respectful social interaction. But beyond that, we need to take some particular stand on what wrongs should be considered public wrongs for which we will collectively hold people responsible. This is universalist, but acknowledges the value of local attachments because variation among the values of different polities is neither a temporary nor lamentable feature of human social life. (Rawls makes the same point about internal disagreement within a free state.)
Free people will never converge on a single comprehensive conception of the good, or even on a compatible set of conceptions. Such consensus only arises through subjugation. There is not a set of objective public values on which we will reach complete consensus, therefore we will not reach total consensus on what qualifies as a public wrong. Duff admits there is reasonable disagreement among polities over what counts as a public wrong. This is explicit in his discussion of how non-citizens who are guests in a state are still subject to its domestic law, even when it differs from their native laws. What counts as a public wrong varies in accordance with the defining values of different polities.
This third option makes the moral community relevant to international criminal law, but it also makes each particular polity relevant to international law. This fills a lacuna in Duff's account. He ties public wrongs in the domestic case to the particular political community's selfdefining values, but there is no analogous political community with self-defining values in the international case. This is why he implicitly resorts to the idea that egregious wrongs and atrocities constitute the relevant international public wrongs. But this leaves us with some uncomfortable results. As discussed earlier, Duff claims that when we think about what concerns us as citizens, we cannot see a rape committed in Poland as something that concerns us and our criminal law. But if the moral community is relevant to the domestic criminal law, then we can say that rapes committed in other states can concern us as citizens. It potentially concerns us because no reasonable set of self-defining values can be compatible with rape. Therefore if it occurs in a state that does not consider it to be a violation of its values, or in a failed state, it does concern us as citizens. That is because showing good will to the residents of that territory requires allowing them to secure the universal human good of living in a polity with a reasonable set of defining values and with a minimally effective system for holding wrongdoers responsible.
That is our concern as citizens because any attempt to hold those wrongdoers responsible must be effected through the political power of our states. We cannot accomplish this individually. If our state has the ability to contribute to holding these people responsible, but does not, then we can justifiably feel guilty about ourselves and resentful of our polity. This is one way to understand the obligation to hold wrongdoers to account even when the wrongs occur outside our polity.
One could object that my view is only a clarification of Duff's, not an alternative. If political consensus is driven by moral egregiousness, then my view is functionally equivalent to Duff's.
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It has the virtue of explaining in greater detail how the system works, but the outcome is the same. In other words, I have proposed that the relevant community is not merely humanity, but the collection of (reasonable) states. I argued that international public wrongs should not be identified with the morally egregious, or with atrocities, but rather with conduct that is seen, by consensus, to be beyond the bounds of what any reasonable state can accept. But if that boundary is defined by consensus on what is morally egregious, then what I have done is provide a more nuanced explanation of how Duff's view works rather than providing a genuine alternative.
The key to seeing how my view is an alternative is to recognize that it is not always the case that the more egregious the moral wrong, the more claim it has to be declared a public wrong.
Consider the controversy over whether certain forms of blasphemy and defamation of religion 29 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this worry .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Long, Ryan. "Responsibility, Authority, and the Community of Moral Agents in Domestic and International Criminal Law." International Criminal Law Review 14, no. 4-5 (2014): 836-854. DOI: 10.1163/15718123-01405006 should be proper concerns of international criminal law. Such proposals have gained almost no traction in the west, but we need not explain that in terms of a disagreement over egregiousness. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 because the universal requirement to hold people responsible should be satisfied in a personal, local way. The ideal is for domestic courts to speak both in the name of justice and in the name of a local community. We can both appeal to the moral community and to the self-defining values of our particular polity. Some public wrongs we see as relevant to the entire moral community because any reasonable set of self-defining values must be opposed to those wrongs.
Other public wrongs are purely internal matters because not every reasonable polity must see the conduct as a public wrong. But within the relevant state, all of those wrongs are the proper concern of all citizens.
Duff objects to the cosmopolitan approach to the domestic criminal law because without appeal to a particular community we will have no way to distinguish private from public wrongs.
However, when it comes to international public wrongs, Duff's view seems to be the one that is unable to explain the distinction between private and public wrongs. If the relevant community is simply the moral community, which is not a political community and therefore lacks selfdefining values, how do we specify the wrongs? Moral egregiousness is not a satisfactory answer because it would mean that no egregious wrongs could be private. If you think blasphemy is an egregious wrong, you must think it is a public wrong. Conversely, the egregiousness of blasphemy must be mitigated if you do not think it is a public wrong. If we take that line, the distinction between public and non-public wrongs disappears. The only distinction remaining is between moral wrongs seen as egregious enough to warrant criminalization and wrongs seen as less weighty.
The answer is that the global community comes to a general consensus on what must be incompatible with any reasonable set of self-defining values. The international case relies upon the domestic case. Duff was correct in his claim that the domestic criminal law is the paradigm 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Long, Ryan. "Responsibility, Authority, and the Community of Moral Agents in Domestic and International Criminal Law." International Criminal Law Review 14, no. 4-5 (2014) down and fails to do this, then for us to show good will towards its residents, we need some international legal system to hold its wrongdoers to account.
One might object that this approach is far too inclusive. It makes many wrongs that are handled domestically, and according to Duff ought to be so handled, a proper international matter of concern. Murder is incompatible with any reasonable set of self-defining values, so is it no longer the proper business of domestic courts? Duff's theory gave an explanation of why murder in one nation is properly tried in that nation. It seems that according to my view, only wrongs on which nations reasonably disagree are appropriate objects of domestic prosecution.
Or, at least, those are the only wrongs that are not potentially the proper concern of international criminal law.
There is simply an overdetermination of reasons to hold the alleged perpetrator to account.
The domestic criminal law acts in the name of both universal justice and the local community.
The reason why most crimes should be handled domestically, and why it is proper for dictators who commit atrocities to be tried locally whenever possible, is that it reinforces the polity's selfdefining values. It is no problem to point out that certain public wrongs are such that prosecuting them would reinforce any reasonable set of self-defining values. This leads to disagreement with 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Long, Ryan. "Responsibility, Authority, and the Community of Moral Agents in Domestic and International Criminal Law." International Criminal Law Review 14, no. 4-5 (2014): 836-854. DOI: 10.1163/15718123-01405006 Duff over the nature of both international and domestic public wrongs. Duff says of international public wrongs that "perpetrators must answer not just to their local communities, but to humanity". 31 I would change the last claim to state that they are potentially answerable to humanity, but only when no particular state adequately holds them responsible. This is far from a merely efficiency-based justification for local attachments. As for domestic public wrongs, Duff argues that crimes such as rape and murder are only our proper concern when they happen in our polity. To the contrary, they are our proper concern everywhere. However, we respect the Territoriality Principle and the Principle of Complementarity (which states that we only try cases not adequately handled by a relevant state's legal system) not merely because this is efficient, but because there is real value in these wrongdoers being brought to account by their own polities.
What is ideal is that all crimes (other than truly international crimes of aggression) be tried locally. Doing so provides an opportunity for fellow citizens to affirm their self-defining values.
Duff is correct that a rape committed in Poland is not the proper business of the English.
However, that is not because the wrongdoer can only be authoritatively tried by his co-citizens, but because Poland has a criminal justice system that treats rape as a public wrong. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Long, Ryan. "Responsibility, Authority, and the Community of Moral Agents in Domestic and International Criminal Law." International Criminal Law Review 14, no. 4-5 (2014) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Long, Ryan. "Responsibility, Authority, and the Community of Moral Agents in Domestic and International Criminal Law." International Criminal Law Review 14, no. 4-5 (2014): 836-854. DOI: 10.1163/15718123-01405006 articulate this notion of reasonableness and to identify the relevant values. This paper has outlined the structure that such a view should take.
Conclusion
This modification of Duff's view allows us to appeal to the moral community in both the domestic and international criminal law without losing the value of particular, local attachments.
My alternative fills out Duff's analysis and provides guidance on how to define international public wrongs. He implicitly relies on the notions of moral egregiousness and atrocities, but they are at best imperfect proxies for what makes something an international public wrong. Consensus on the boundaries of reasonable self-defining values for polities determines the set of international public wrongs. My proposal takes what is so powerful in his domestic analysis and repurposes it to answer these international questions .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Long, Ryan. "Responsibility, Authority, and the Community of Moral Agents in Domestic and International Criminal Law." International Criminal Law Review 14, no. 4-5 (2014): 836-854. DOI: 10.1163/15718123-01405006 
